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INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a physically handicapped person who has
been called for jury service.  The local courthouse has just un-
dergone significant renovations.  To improve access for the dis-
abled, they have added, among other things, a wheelchair ramp
to the main entrance, elevators to the courtrooms, and wheel-
chair seating in the courtroom and jury box.  Interpreters can
now be requested for deaf participants in court proceedings.
These accommodations will make jury service much more con-
venient and comfortable for you than it would have been in the
past.  You tell the judge that you are more than able to serve on
a jury, in spite of your disability, and have no biases that would
render you unable to make a fair decision, and make it through
the voir dire phase.  It seems as though you are about to be
seated on the petit jury and begin observing the trial, but then
the prosecuting attorney uses peremptory strikes to remove
you, along with the only two other jurors with a visible disabil-
ity, from the jury with no explanation.  Under existing equal
protection law, neither you nor the defense attorney has any
legal grounds to contest these strikes, or even to demand an
explanation from the prosecutor as to why he used half of his
peremptory strikes to remove all three disabled jurors from the
venire.1
Buoyed by legislation such as the Americans With Disabili-
ties Act, America has developed some of the most accessible
infrastructure in the world for the disabled.2  The ADA provides
the disabled with statutory protection from discrimination in
employment3 and requires employers and public accommoda-
tions, regardless of whether they receive federal funding, to
provide reasonable accommodations for the disabled.4  But de-
1 See Matthew J. Crehan, The Disability-Based Peremptory Challenge: Does
It Validate Discrimination Against Blind Prospective Jurors?, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 531,
551–52 (1998).
2 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012)).
3 Id. § 12112.
4 Id. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
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spite these legislative successes, the disabled still face many
obstacles to their full participation in many facets of life, and
participation on juries remains an especially difficult task.
While federal and some state lawmakers have passed laws pro-
tecting the right of disabled individuals to serve on juries un-
less they are physically or mentally incapable of serving,5 many
other procedural obstacles exist, and, because each state cre-
ates their own eligibility laws, the disabled face variable protec-
tions across states.6  States draw jurors from jury lists that
underrepresent the disabled,7 and some allow for the dismissal
of certain disabled jurors with for-cause strikes.8
Peremptory strikes of disabled jurors remain constitutional
nationwide today, in spite of the growing body of law prohibit-
ing these strikes on the basis of qualities such as race, gender,
and sexual orientation, and the Supreme Court has yet to take
up the issue directly.  Peremptory strikes of disabled jurors
serve as an additional, discretionary way in which the disabled
are discouraged from serving on juries, even when a particular
juror’s disability does not actually preclude him or her from
carrying out the duties of jury service, and they have not been
eliminated at the for-cause removal stage.9
Undoubtedly, the disabled provide a valuable perspective
and a unique voice in deliberations, contributing to the ideal of
a representative jury.10  In recognition of this, many commen-
tators have begun calling for improved access to jury service for
individuals with disabilities,11 and the ABA has even recom-
mended that “[c]ourts should provide an adequate and suitable
environment for jurors, including those who require reasonable
5 See, e.g., The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1865(b)(4) (2012) (providing that all persons over the age of eighteen will not be
disqualified to serve on a jury unless they are “incapable, by reason of mental or
physical infirmity, to render satisfactory jury service”).
6 See Kristi Bleyer et. al., Access to Jury Service for Persons with Disabilities,
19 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 249, 250 (1995) (noting that few states
prohibit juror discrimination on the basis of disability).
7 See Hon. Donovan W. Frank & Brian N. Aleinikoff, Juries and the Disabled,
59 FED. LAW., Dec. 2012, at 34, 36.
8 See Crehan, supra note 1, at 536. R
9 Id. at 551–52.
10 The Supreme Court acknowledged the American ideal of a representative
jury in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., in which the Court notes that “[t]he American
tradition of trial by jury . . . necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn
from a cross-section of the community.” See NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS,
AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 74 (2007) (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,
220, 223–24 (1946)).
11 See, e.g., Frank & Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 36 (arguing that presence of a R
disabled person on a jury helps a party receive a fair trial).
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accommodation due to disability,”12 and that “[e]ligibility for
jury service should not be denied or limited on the basis of . . .
disability.”13  But even if the disabled face no statutory or phys-
ical barriers to jury service, they can be struck at the peremp-
tory-strike phase because of their disability.  While no
empirical studies have been conducted on the use of peremp-
tory strikes against disabled jurors,14 their discretionary na-
ture and the lack of protections given to disabled jurors suggest
that they threaten to at least partially undermine recent ad-
vances in the accessibility of jury service.15
This Note will explore the Supreme Court’s decision in Bat-
son v. Kentucky16 and the gradual expansion of its protections
to other categories such as gender, ethnicity, and (at the circuit
level) sexual orientation.  I will show that, despite recent expan-
sions of the Batson challenge to sexual orientation in the
SmithKline v. Abbott Laboratories17 decision, achieving Batson
protections for disabled jurors is unlikely given the Court’s use
of equal protection analysis when examining allegedly discrimi-
natory peremptory strikes.  I will then look at several recent
lower court decisions examining peremptory strikes of disabled
jurors to demonstrate how little protection the current equal
protection jurisprudence affords disabled jurors in practice.
While there is some possibility that rational basis-level review
could afford protections against discriminatory peremptory
strikes of disabled jurors, it is almost certainly inadequate to
combat them.
After synthesizing these decisions, I will show that consti-
tutional law does not, and will not, provide protection for dis-
abled jurors against peremptory strikes.  Nevertheless,
disabled jurors should be protected from discriminatory strikes
so that their viewpoints are represented and to ensure that
they have this opportunity for valuable civic participation.  Dis-
12 AM. BAR ASSOC., PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS 5 (2005).
13 Id. at 4.
14 However, some anecdotal evidence exists. E.g., David G. Hart & Russell D.
Cawyer, Batson and Its Progeny Prohibit the Use of Peremptory Challenges Based
upon Disability and Religion: A Practitioner’s Guide for Requesting a Civil Batson
Hearing, 26 TEX. TECH L. REV. 109, 110 (1994) (“Attorneys defending personal
injury cases often use peremptory challenges to strike members of the venire who
have sustained disabling injuries.”).
15 See Andrew Weis, Peremptory Challenges: The Last Barrier to Jury Service
for People with Disabilities, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 5 (1997) (“[P]eople with
disabilities confront one final, but imposing, hurdle [to jury service]—the peremp-
tory challenge.”).
16 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
17 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014).
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crimination against jurors on the basis of their disability poses
similar risks of dignitary harm and reinforcement of negative
stereotypes as does discrimination on the basis of race or gen-
der.  But statutory law, rather than constitutional equal pro-
tection principles, is the most viable means to protect disabled
jurors from peremptory strikes.  I will conclude with a look at
some current and recent laws that have been enacted or pro-
posed to modify procedural codes to prevent peremptory
strikes on the basis of disability and the limits of such legisla-
tion.  The recent passage of one of these laws demonstrates the
political viability of these statutory protections, and they re-
present a promising avenue forward for advocates of eliminat-
ing discriminatory strikes of disabled jurors.
I
JURY SELECTION AND THE BATSON RIGHT
While jury selection is a complex process that varies signif-
icantly across jurisdictions, the peremptory strike phase is al-
most always the final step in assembling a petit jury from a
larger jury pool.18  Following the voir dire phase, in which the
attorneys or the trial judge conduct a preliminary questioning
of potential jurors, the attorneys may ask the court, at its dis-
cretion, to strike jurors that they believe have demonstrated
bias or are otherwise unqualified to sit on the petit jury “for
cause.”19  After the court has ruled on these “for cause” chal-
lenges, each party receives a limited number of peremptory
strikes, or challenges without cause, which they can use to
strike jurors that they perceive would be unfavorable to their
client without articulating any reason for the court.20
Although statutory exclusions from jury service on the ba-
sis of race have long been held unconstitutional,21 the Court
had dismissed the potential constitutional violations posed by
18 See, e.g., David Hittner & Eric J.R. Nichols, Jury Selection in Federal Civil
Litigation: General Procedures, New Rules, and the Arrival of Batson, 23 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 407, 448–56 (1992) (describing the peremptory challenge process in fed-
eral civil litigation following the challenge for cause phase).
19 See id. at 444–46.
20 See Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare
More Than the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1085 (2011).
21 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (invalidating a
statute limiting jury service to white persons); see also Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328
U.S. 217, 222 (1946) (holding that the jury pool must be selected by nondiscrimi-
natory criteria).
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the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes.22  In Swain v.
Alabama, the Court found that a prosecutor’s use of peremp-
tory strikes to remove all black jurors in a rape case did not
present a constitutional violation.23  Although the Swain court
acknowledged that repeated discriminatory use of peremptory
strikes could pose an equal protection violation, it required an
insurmountable prima facie showing of repeated use of per-
emptory strikes against jurors of one race over many trials.24
In practice, discriminatory peremptory strikes continued. Bat-
son was thus decided against a backdrop of court-sanctioned
de facto racial discrimination in jury selection in which blacks
were excluded from juries at alarming rates.  In some districts,
prosecutors were using peremptory strikes against black jurors
at rates several times more frequently than against whites.25
II
CREATION AND EXPANSION OF THE BATSON CHALLENGE
In order to understand how the Batson challenge could
protect disabled jurors from discriminatory peremptory strikes,
it is important to understand its mechanics.  An analysis of the
Batson challenge’s legal framework in equal protection juris-
prudence will also reveal the difficulty of expanding its protec-
tions to disabled jurors.
A. Mechanics of the Batson Challenge
A departure from earlier cases disallowing discrimination
in jury service, which focused on defendants’ Sixth Amend-
ment rights to have a jury composed of a “fair cross section” of
society,26 Batson reframed this interest in non-discriminatory
jury selection as an equal protection right of the defendant, and
established a procedure by which litigants could challenge dis-
criminatory peremptory strikes.27  Recognizing that Swain’s re-
quirement that a defendant show “proof of repeated striking of
blacks over a number of cases” to establish a prima facie equal
22 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221–22 (1965) (finding no constitu-
tional violation in spite of the fact that no black person had served on a jury in the
county in over thirty years).
23 Id.
24 See id. at 223–24, 227.
25 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103–04 (1986) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring); see also JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION
PROMOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 6 (2010) (noting that all-
white juries continued in many courts after Swain).
26 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537
(1975).
27 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 96–97.
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protection violation was a practical impossibility, the Batson
Court aimed to create a procedure for challenging peremptory
strikes that was not purely theoretical,28 now known as a “Bat-
son challenge.”29  Under the Court’s new formulation, “a defen-
dant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence
concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges
at the defendant’s trial,” which could consist of, for example, a
“ ‘pattern’ of strikes against black jurors included in the partic-
ular venire.”30
The Batson challenge can be thus be synthesized into a
three-step test.31  First, the challenging party must make a
prima facie showing of discriminatory use of peremptory
strikes.32  Second, the burden shifts to the striking party,
which must put forward a race-neutral explanation for striking
the juror.33  This is a relatively low standard to meet, and “need
not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for
cause.”34  Finally, the trial court will decide if the challenging
party has proven purposive discrimination.35  Subsequent Su-
preme Court cases have expanded the scope of the Batson
challenge to include peremptory strikes made on the basis of
gender and ethnicity,36 and have allowed it to be invoked by
either party in both civil and criminal cases.37  Additionally,
jurors may also suffer an equal protection violation if they are
excluded from a jury by a discriminatory peremptory strike.38
Due to the impracticality of a struck juror bringing legal action
against the state on his own behalf, defendants have third-
28 Id. at 92–93.
29 See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed
Motives and Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279, 303 (2007)
(“[T]he Supreme Court considered a Batson challenge to the prosecutor’s strikes
against bilingual Hispanic jurors . . . .”).
30 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–97.
31 See A.C. Johnstone, Peremptory Pragmatism: Religion and the Administra-
tion of the Batson Rule, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 441, 445–46.
32 Id. at 446.
33 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
34 Id.
35 Johnstone, supra note 31, at 446. R
36 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (gender); Her-
nandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991) (ethnicity).  The Supreme Court has
declined to rule on any additional cases that would expand Batson challenges to
additional groups.
37 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 54–55 (1992) (allowing either party to
use Batson challenges); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616
(1991) (allowing Batson challenges in civil cases).
38 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991).
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party standing to raise these jurors’ rights during the peremp-
tory strike phase.39
Although “[t]he Constitution forbids striking even a single
prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose,”40 the efficacy
of the procedures set out in Batson in actually preventing the
discriminatory use of peremptory strikes has been the subject
of much debate,41 particularly due to the ease with which a
striking party can meet the burden of showing a non-pretex-
tual, race-neutral reason for striking a juror.42  In Purkett v.
Elem, the Supreme Court affirmed that the proffered race-neu-
tral justification need not be “persuasive, or even plausible”
and held that a prosecutor had met this burden when he ex-
plained that he struck a black juror because he thought his
long hair and mustache made him look “suspicious.”43
Additionally, a trial court’s highly discretionary decision to
accept or reject a proffered justification will be given great def-
erence on appeal,44 making it difficult for appellants to suc-
cessfully raise this issue unless there is clear evidence in the
record that the justification is pretextual.45  Obviously, explicit
evidence of a discriminatory motivation will often be hard to
find.  Litigants are thus often forced to instead prove implicit
discrimination by showing that “a prosecutor’s proffered rea-
son for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an other-
wise-similar non-black [panelist] who is permitted to serve.”46
In spite of these shortcomings, it is undoubted that litigants
now frequently employ Batson challenges during the peremp-
tory strike phase and on appeal, and that there has been at
39 Id. at 414–15.
40 Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008) (quoting United States v.
Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 1994)).
41 E.g., BLACK STRIKES, http://blackstrikes.com [https://perma.cc/6VP7-
XLBF] (noting the significant disparity in prosecutors’ use of peremptory strike
usage against black and white jurors in Caddo Parish, Louisiana).
42 See generally Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection:
Professional Misconduct, Not Legitimate Advocacy, 22 REV. LITIG. 209, 213–14
(2003) (arguing that Batson “has . . . been decidedly ineffective in achieving its
original goals”).
43 514 U.S. 765, 767–68 (1995) (per curiam).
44 See Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477.
45 E.g., Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1755 (2016) (overturning a trial
court’s acceptance of the prosecution’s non-racial explanation for striking the
only four black jurors during the peremptory strike phase based on an extensive
written record from the prosecutor’s office indicating racially motivated reasons
for striking each juror).
46 Id. at 1754 (alteration in original) (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S.
231, 241 (2005)).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-2\CRN204.txt unknown Seq: 9 15-JAN-18 14:06
2018] STRICKEN 445
least some reduction in the use of discriminatory peremptory
strikes since the advent of the Batson challenge.47
B. Batson’s Equal Protection Analysis Framework
Although Batson clearly described the procedure that
could be employed by defendants to challenge racially discrimi-
natory peremptory strikes and the harms posed by the exclu-
sion of jurors on the basis of race,48 it gave little indication of
what, if any, principle the Court would use in the future when
deciding what juror qualities would or would not receive the
protections of the Batson challenge.  It was not until eight years
later when the Court finally enunciated such a principle in
J.E.B. v. Alabama.49  In expanding the Batson challenge to gen-
der-based peremptory strikes, the Court was careful to limit its
holding.  It affirmed the continued role of the peremptory strike
as a litigants’ tool, noting that the holding “does not imply the
elimination of all peremptory challenges,” and should not “con-
flict with a State’s legitimate interest in using such challenges
in its effort to secure a fair and impartial jury.”50  Most impor-
tantly, the Court specified that “[p]arties may . . . exercise their
peremptory challenges to remove from the venire any group or
class of individuals normally subject to ‘rational basis’ re-
view.”51 Batson could therefore only apply to classifications
that receive heightened scrutiny, though the J.E.B. court was
silent as to whether or not this was sufficient.52
The Supreme Court’s adoption of the tiered scrutiny frame-
work for establishing Batson protections has the advantage of
being responsive to changes in equal protection jurisprudence.
A recent Ninth Circuit decision, SmithKline  Beecham Corp. v.
Abbot Laboratories, illustrates that this framework provides the
real potential for expansion of Batson challenges.53  In the pre-
ceding litigation, an attorney had used a peremptory strike to
remove a juror who had revealed that he was married to a man
47 See David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital
Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 3, 75 fig.4
(2001) (showing a slight decline in the use of peremptory strikes against black
jurors by prosecutors in Philadelphia since Batson was decided); Covey, supra
note 29, at 284–85 n.19 (noting that a database search of “Batson” and “jury” in R
federal and state court cases for the year 2005 yielded 573 results, indicating that
parties are raising and litigating these challenges).
48 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87, 96–98 (1986).
49 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).
50 Id. at 143.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 740 F.3d 471, 479 (9th Cir. 2014).
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during voir dire.54  The attorney provided no reasons for his
strike of that juror when challenged, though the trial judge
eventually declined to sustain the challenge on the belief that
Batson did not extend to sexual orientation.55  Noting that the
“fundamental legal question before us [is] whether Batson pro-
hibits strikes based on sexual orientation,” the Ninth Circuit
proceeded to analyze what level of scrutiny sexual orientation
classifications should receive.56  While earlier Supreme Court
and Ninth Circuit precedents were ambiguous about the cor-
rect level of scrutiny to apply, the court found that the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor57 established that
gays and lesbians are no longer a group or class of individuals
normally subject to rational basis review.58  This heightened
scrutiny classification, combined with the history of systematic
exclusion faced by gays and lesbians, confirmed for the court
that Batson prohibited peremptory strikes on the basis of sex-
ual orientation.59
While not all commentators agree that the Ninth Circuit
was correct to apply heightened scrutiny to sexual identity,60 it
reveals the flexibility of equal protection doctrine.  Changes in
societal values in America and the world are often reflected in
the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, as “the
Court has recognized that new insights and societal under-
standings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most
fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and un-
challenged.”61  The rapidly increasing awareness and accept-
ance of minority sexual orientations and gender identities,
which have never explicitly received heightened scrutiny, could
thus lead to the Court applying a higher level of scrutiny to
these classifications than it has in the past.62  Once heightened
54 Id. at 475.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 479.
57 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
58 SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 483–84 (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511
U.S. at 143).
59 Id. at 485.
60 See Ari Ezra Waldman, Gay Jurors and Marriage Equality: The Common
Legal Thread, TOWLEROAD (Jan. 22, 2014, 2:40 PM) http://www.towleroad.com/
2014/01/jurormarriage [https://perma.cc/2QGN-J4QR] (“Just because Windsor
used something more than rational basis does not necessarily mean it used
heightened scrutiny.”).
61 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015).
62 For example, the Court began treating gender classification with height-
ened scrutiny in Craig v. Boren after initially only affording them rational basis
review. Compare Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (applying rational basis
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-2\CRN204.txt unknown Seq: 11 15-JAN-18 14:06
2018] STRICKEN 447
scrutiny is applied to a classification, Batson could then be
found to prohibit peremptory strikes on that basis.63
While the expansion of Batson protections at the lower
court level to classifications beginning to be deemed suspect,
like sexual orientation or gender identity, or classifications tra-
ditionally afforded heightened scrutiny,64 has a sound theoreti-
cal basis and is even beginning to appear likely,65 the same
cannot be said for disability.66 J.E.B. draws a clear line in the
sand between groups subject to rational basis review and those
subject to heightened scrutiny, clarifying that courts should
not question the motives of peremptory strikes against groups
subject only to rational basis review.67  One commentator la-
mented, in 1997, that “the status of disability-based peremp-
tory challenges will remain shrouded in doubt” due to “the
Court’s ambiguous and still evolving approach to disability
equal protection.”68  While there was once doubt about how
courts would handle Batson challenges to strikes of disabled
jurors, recent judicial developments have rendered the possi-
bility increasingly unlikely.69
III
EXISTING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IS UNLIKELY TO LEAD TO THE
EXTENSION OF BATSON PROTECTIONS TO THE DISABLED
Because disability is subject only to rational basis review,70
courts are unlikely to entertain Batson challenges to peremp-
tory strikes of disabled jurors due to the clear language of the
J.E.B. holding that parties may use “peremptory challenges to
remove from the venire any group or class of individuals nor-
mally subject to ‘rational basis’ review.”71  Lower courts have
additionally not invalidated the use of a peremptory strike
against a disabled juror since J.E.B. was decided.
review to gender classifications) with Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–202
(1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to gender classifications).
63 See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 484 (finding that J.E.B. prohibits the use of
peremptory strikes against members of any group that receives heightened
scrutiny).
64 E.g., State v. Purcell, 18 P.3d 113, 120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that
Batson prohibits peremptory strikes on the basis of religious affiliation).
65 See Kristal Petrovich, Extending Batson to Sexual Orientation: A Look at
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1681, 1709 (2015).
66 See Weis, supra note 15, at 3. R
67 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994).
68 Weis, supra note 15, at 64. R
69 See, e.g., J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 145–46 (omitting disability as a basis for
protection for jury participation).
70 See City of Cleburne. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
71 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143.
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A. Disability Is Subject Only to Rational Basis Review
The tiered scrutiny framework is the cornerstone of the
Supreme Court’s equal protection law.  The Court has long
acknowledged that the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment72 is “essentially a direction that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike.”73  Laws that disad-
vantage members of “suspect class[es],” marginalized groups of
“discrete and insular minorities” that have been “subjected to
. . . a history of purposeful unequal treatment,”74 are therefore
subject to thorough equal protection review.  Because classifi-
cations of citizens according to factors such as race or national
origin are highly unlikely to have any real relation to legitimate
state goals, any laws classifying citizens on this basis are in-
herently suspect and presumably violate the Equal Protection
Clause unless they can survive “strict scrutiny.”75  Strict scru-
tiny is the highest standard of review applied by courts in equal
protection analysis.76  Such laws will survive strict scrutiny
“only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling govern-
mental interests.”77 Batson implicitly incorporates this stan-
dard into the Batson challenge procedure: since race is
“unrelated to [a person’s] fitness as a juror,”78 a decision to
strike a juror based solely on his race or the belief that his race
is a proxy for bias79 cannot possibly survive strict scrutiny.
Therefore, a party can only sustain their strike against a Bat-
son challenge by offering a non-pretextual race neutral justifi-
cation for the strike,80 showing that the strike was not actually
made on the basis of a racial classification.
The Supreme Court has applied the next level of review,
heightened scrutiny, primarily to classifications based on gen-
der,81 as they “frequently bear[ ] no relation to [the] ability to
perform or contribute to society.”82  But differential treatment
72 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
73 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439.
74 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
75 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
76 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
77 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (quoting
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003)).
78 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co.,
328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946)).
79 Id. at 97.
80 See id.
81 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); but see Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S.
259, 275 (1978) (applying heightened scrutiny to illegitimacy); Graham v. Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (applying heightened scrutiny to alienage).
82 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440–41 (1985)
(quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)).
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of individuals based on these “quasi-suspect” classifications
may sometimes be justified due to the existence of distinguish-
ing characteristics such as “[p]hysical differences” between
men and women.83  States may utilize quasi-suspect classifica-
tions if they are “substantially related to a sufficiently impor-
tant governmental interest” and not based on “outmoded
notions of the relative capabilities of men and women.”84
Rational basis review is the lowest level of equal protection
review.85  Any group that possesses “distinguishing character-
istics relevant to interests the State has the authority to imple-
ment” is subject to this level of review.86  As these
classifications are not inherently suspect, they enjoy a pre-
sumption of validity.87  While both strict and heightened scru-
tiny review require the state to prove that the challenged
classifications are serving an important state interest, rational
basis is a highly deferential standard of review that merely
requires a showing that the classification is “rationally related
to a legitimate government purpose.”88  The standard of review
is quite low: so long as “there is any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classifi-
cation,” it will be upheld.89
The Supreme Court has never held that disability is a sus-
pect or quasi-suspect class.  It first considered what level of
scrutiny was appropriate for disability classifications in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, finding that rational basis
review was appropriate for the “mentally retarded.”90  As the
mentally retarded have significantly different needs than the
rest of the population, “the States’ interest in dealing with and
providing for them is plainly a legitimate one,” and classifica-
tions based on mental retardation are necessary for the state to
legislate to meet these needs effectively.91  The Cleburne court
notably gave little consideration to the history of discrimination
83 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442; United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533
(1996).
84 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441.
85 See Katie R. Eyer, Protected Class Rational Basis Review, 95 N.C. L. REV.
975, 977 (2017).
86 Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 (2001) (quoting
Clerburne, 473 U.S. at 441).
87 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (“A statute is presumed
constitutional.”).
88 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446–47.
89 Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’n, Inc., 508 U.S.
307, 313 (1993)).
90 473 U.S. at 442.
91 Id. at 442–44.
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faced by the mentally retarded, and saw statutes that pre-
vented discrimination on the basis of disability in certain areas
as evidence that the mentally retarded were not politically
marginalized.92
Still, a law must be based on more than “negative atti-
tudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly
cognizable” to survive a rational basis inquiry.93  Thus, mere
animosity towards a specific group cannot possibly be consid-
ered a legitimate state interest.  Ultimately, the Court found the
regulation at issue in Cleburne, which required that a special
use permit be obtained for the construction of hospitals for the
mentally retarded, to fail to satisfy even this lenient standard.94
Since the city had no “rational basis for believing that the . . .
home would pose any special threat to the city’s legitimate
interests,” it violated the Equal Protection Clause as it “ap-
pear[ed] . . . to rest on an irrational prejudice against the men-
tally retarded.”95
The Court again applied, without ruling on, this level of
scrutiny to the mentally ill in 1993 in Heller v. Doe96 and to the
entirety of “the disabled” in Board of Trustees of University of
Alabama v. Garrett in 2001, noting that this level of scrutiny
means that “[s]tates are not required by the Fourteenth
Amendment to make special accommodations for the dis-
abled.”97  With this ruling in Garrett, the Court appears to have
definitively ruled that disability is subject only to rational basis
review, and that this classification does not only apply to the
mentally retarded.98
B. The ADA Does Not Entitle the Disabled to Heightened
Scrutiny Protection
Many felt that the Court’s relegation of disability to rational
basis review in Cleburne was unwise and did not reflect an
adequate consideration of the history of discrimination faced
by the disabled.99  Commentators were thus initially optimistic
92 Id. at 445.
93 Id. at 448.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 450.
96 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993).
97 Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001).
98 Id. at 366–67.
99 See, e.g., Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move
to Integration, 64 Temp. L. Rev. 393, 404–07, 436 (1991) (detailing history of
government-sponsored discrimination against the disabled and arguing that
Cleburne ignored this historical legacy).
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that the passage of the ADA would cause or require courts to
begin utilizing Batson-like hearings for challenges against par-
ties’ use of peremptory strikes against jurors on the basis of
disability.100  Of particular import were Congressional findings
that “[the disabled] are a discrete and insular minority who
have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a
position of political powerlessness in our society.”101  Courts
would be informed, the argument goes, by contemporary legis-
lation, like the ADA, describing discrimination issues faced by
society, and develop an equal protection jurisprudence to ac-
commodate these legislative findings.102  In the case of the
ADA, this would lead to courts applying higher levels of scru-
tiny to the disabled in an equal protection analysis than the low
level of rational basis review previously used in Cleburne and
Garrett.103
The Supreme Court has implicitly rejected such reasoning
in subsequent decisions.  As a matter of constitutional law,
Congress may not require that state or local government ac-
tions be held to a more stringent standard of equal protection
review than that prescribed by the Supreme Court.104  In City
of Boerne v. Flores, the Court rejected such an attempt by
Congress to subject state and local government action that
would burden the exercise of religion to strict scrutiny when
the Court had already decided on a lower level of scrutiny,
noting that “[w]hen the political branches of the Government
act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the
Constitution already issued . . . the Court will treat its prece-
dents with the respect due them under settled principles, in-
cluding stare decisis . . . .”105  Despite the merits of arguments
that the ADA may nevertheless inform, but not dictate, the
100 See James B. Miller, The Disabled, the ADA, and Strict Scrutiny, 6 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 393, 417–19 (1994).
101 Mary A. Lynch, The Application of Equal Protection to Prospective Jurors
with Disabilities: Will Batson Cover Disability-Based Strikes?, 57 ALB. L. REV. 289,
342–43 (1993) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2008)).
102 Id. at 333–34.
103 Miller, supra note 100, at 417–19. R
104 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (finding that such
action is not a valid exercise of Congress’s power to “enforce” Fourteenth Amend-
ment protections against the states).  Although, like much civil rights legislation,
the ADA is also constitutionally based in Congress’s commerce powers and may
not technically be subject to this constraint, some lower courts have applied the
same logic to the ADA. E.g., United States v. Harris, 197 F.3d 870, 875–76 (7th
Cir. 1999) (“Congress does not have the power to create constitutional rights or
declare a class of persons ‘suspect’ under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
105 521 U.S. at 536.
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Court’s equal protection classifications,106 it does not appear to
have had this effect.  The Court has not backed away from its
application of rational basis review to disability in cases de-
cided after the passage of the ADA,107 nor has it given any
consideration to the ADA at all when deciding the appropriate
level of scrutiny.108
C. Statutory Protections of the ADA Do Not Independently
Entitle the Disabled to Batson-Like Hearings
The contention that the ADA provision that “no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,
be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity”109 provides in-
dependent statutory protection for the disabled against per-
emptory strikes has yet to be considered by the courts.
However, it has been contended that this argument is on weak
standing because such a categorical exclusion on disability-
based peremptory strikes could fall into the ADA’s exemption
from its mandate for reasonable accommodations when creat-
ing these accommodations would “fundamentally alter the na-
ture of . . . goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations.”110  These provisions of the ADA have to date
been applied only to invalidate categorical statutory exclusions
of the disabled from jury service.111
D. Recent Appellate Court Decisions Have Upheld the Use
of Peremptory Strikes Against Disabled Jurors
Two recent (relatively speaking) appellate court decisions
considering this issue—United States v. Harris112 and United
States v. Watson113—further illustrate that the equal protec-
tion framework will not allow Batson challenges to peremptory
strikes of the disabled.  These cases also show that whatever
106 See Lynch, supra note 101, at 342–43. R
107 See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366–67 (2001)
(again applying rational basis review to classifications based on disability).
108 Michael E. Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law, 63 EMORY L. REV.
527, 541–42 (2014) (“Despite the ADA’s attempt to alter the legal construction of
disability, constitutionally, the distinctions Cleburne created have remained.”).
109 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).
110 See Crehan, supra note 1, at 550–51 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) R
(1997)).
111 See, e.g., Galloway v. Super. Ct., 816 F. Supp. 12, 18–19 (D.D.C. 1993)
(finding that a state law excluding the blind from jury duty violated the ADA).
112 United States v. Harris, 197 F.3d 870, 872 (7th Cir. 1999).
113 United States v. Watson, 483 F.3d 828, 829 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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protections rational basis review may provide to stricken dis-
abled jurors in theory, its extremely low standards are unlikely
to prohibit any peremptory strikes in practice.
In United States v. Harris, the Seventh Circuit considered a
criminal defendant’s contention that the trial court erred when
it allowed the prosecution to peremptorily strike a juror with
multiple sclerosis.114  Applying the rational basis standard of
review, the court accepted the government’s explanation that it
had struck the juror because she was on medication that the
government suspected might make her drowsy as “rationally
related to the state’s legitimate purpose of selecting an impar-
tial jury.”115  Further, the court interpreted the holding of
J.E.B. to mean that characteristics not subject to heightened
scrutiny, including disability, “may be used to excuse jurors
because of concerns about their potential bias, even if that bias
flows from stereotypes related to group membership” as they do
not “reinforce . . . stereotypes about the group’s competence or
predispositions.”116  But an irrational justification, such as
“animosity toward or fear of disabled people” would not be a
legitimate reason to strike a juror.117  In United States v. Wat-
son, the D.C. Circuit considered a similar challenge on appeal
by the defendant of the peremptory strikes of two blind ju-
rors.118  The court again found that heightened scrutiny did
not apply to peremptory strikes of the disabled, then consid-
ered if the strikes of the blind jurors had a “rational relation-
ship to a legitimate governmental purpose.”119  The court
concluded that these strikes were rationally related to the pur-
pose of securing a fair trial because the government noted that
they intended to introduce visual evidence at the trial that the
jurors would not be able to evaluate.120  Notably, neither
party’s counsel nor the court suggested the possibility of pro-
viding accommodations for the blind jurors.121
114 197 F.3d at 872.
115 Id. at 876.
116 Id. at 874 (internal citations omitted).
117 Id. at 876.
118 483 F.3d at 829.
119 Id. at 833 (internal citations omitted).
120 Id. at 834–35.
121 Id.
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IV
COULD THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST PROVIDE PROTECTIONS
FOR DISABLED JURORS?
One possible solution that has yet to receive much serious
consideration is the possibility that rational basis review could
provide disabled jurors protection independent of the Batson
regime.  Such an option is attractive in some ways as it would
not require the unlikely extension of Batson to disability or an
increase in the level of scrutiny afforded to disability classifica-
tions, nor would it require any legislative action or a significant
change in the law.  If a rational basis test is applied to strikes of
disabled jurors, then litigants could challenge a peremptory
strike of a disabled juror by showing that it was irrational or
unrelated to the legitimate state goal of assembling an impar-
tial jury.  Although this approach would not prevent litigants
from striking jurors on the basis of their disability altogether, it
would prevent them from doing so when there is no rational
connection between their disability and their ability to serve in
a particular case.  However, it remains to be seen if this ap-
proach possesses any real legal force and it is unclear how it
would be applied at trial during the jury selection procedure.
There is some theoretical basis for such an argument.
Even though disability receives only a rational basis level re-
view, the Court has invalidated many laws that classify on the
basis of disability when it has been unable to find any rational
basis for this classification.122  One could literally read the lan-
guage in Batson noting that “the State’s privilege to strike indi-
vidual jurors through peremptory challenges . . . is subject to
the commands of the Equal Protection Clause,”123 to mean that
whatever protections the Equal Protection Clause affords to
rational basis groups can be vindicated by these groups
against discriminatory peremptory strikes. Cleburne itself in-
validated a local law requiring a special zoning permit for con-
struction of homes for the mentally retarded as there was no
rational basis for the law in the record.124  In Tennessee v.
Lane, the Court found that provisions of Title II of the ADA
mandating equal access to courts for the disabled were a valid
use of Congress’s ability to enforce the guarantees of the Equal
122 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985)
(invalidating a local law requiring a special zoning permit for construction of
homes for the mentally retarded as there was no rational basis for the law in the
record).
123 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
124 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
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Protection Clause against the states.125  Categorical bans of all
persons with a certain disability from jury service also likely
violate the Equal Protection Clause as they lack a rational rela-
tion to a legitimate government purpose.126
This issue, however, has seldom been litigated at either the
state or federal level, and when it has, the results have gener-
ally not been promising.  In cases in which the issue has been
litigated, courts have almost always found that the strike meets
the low standard of “any reason rationally related to the selec-
tion of an impartial jury,” even when the justification may fall
far short of what would warrant a for-cause dismissal.127  This
calls to mind a frequent criticism of the Batson test—the ease
with which a striking attorney can create a justification that
masks the racial nature of the strike,128 a problem which is
only magnified at the rational basis level.  Moreover, the courts
in these cases do not explicitly rule on whether or not the
rational basis standard should be applied to peremptory
strikes; they merely assume that it is applicable, which likely
ends further litigation of the issue on subsequent appeals.129
Although the courts in Watson and Harris both upheld the
challenged peremptory strike, these cases do not exactly rule
out the possibility that the rational basis test may have some
efficacy.  They can be distinguished by the fact that there was a
rational basis for the exclusion of the jurors at issue in each of
these cases.  In Watson, the court accepted the argument that
the blind jurors were struck because the state intended to pre-
125 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004).
126 See Watson, 483 F.3d at 833 (citing Lane, 541 U.S. at 524, n.9) (“As
examples of such violations [of rational basis], the Court referenced absolute bars
to jury service by disabled individuals and discretionary bars invoked by trial
judges.”).
127 E.g., id. at 829 (permitting the strike of two blind jurors on the basis of their
inability to evaluate visual evidence); United States v. Harris, 197 F.3d 870, 872
(7th Cir. 1999) (permitting strike of a juror with multiple sclerosis who “might
have trouble climbing stairs and staying awake”); Jones v. State, 548 S.E.2d 75,
77 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (permitting a strike because the prosecutor worried he may
not be able to speak loudly enough for hearing-impaired juror to hear him); People
v. Falkenstein, 732 N.Y.S.2d 817, 817–18 (4th Dep’t 2001) (permitting a strike
due to concern about hearing-impaired juror’s ability to hear inflections in the
defendant’s voice on an audiotape being presented as evidence).
128 E.g., Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 20, at 1077 (“While the [Supreme] Court R
has consistently reaffirmed its 1986 holding in Batson v. Kentucky that race-
based peremptory strikes are unconstitutional, virtually every commentator (and
numerous judges) who have studied the issue have concluded that race-based
juror strikes continue to plague American trials.” (footnotes omitted)).
129 E.g., Harris, 197 F.3d at 874 (“[B]ecause [defendant] contests even the
rationality of [stricken juror]’s exclusion, we will briefly discuss the peremptory
exercised here.”).
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sent visual evidence, and it was rational for them to believe that
they may have difficulty presenting this evidence to blind ju-
rors.130  Likewise, the peremptory strike in Harris was rational
because the stricken juror was on multiple sclerosis medica-
tion that made her drowsy and could potentially compromise
her ability to pay attention at the trial.131  Thus, although
courts seem at least open to the idea of invalidating a strike of a
disabled juror that was made for an irrational reason,132 the
right situation has apparently yet to be presented.
While these cases do leave open the possibility that ra-
tional basis review may prohibit strikes of the disabled in some
circumstances, the scope of such protection would necessarily
be very narrow and not sufficient to truly combat discrimina-
tory peremptory strikes of disabled jurors.  If a strike will be
considered rational unless based on “an irrational animosity
toward or fear of disabled people,”133 or a “vague, undifferenti-
ated fear that [disabled] persons are incapable of serving as
jurors,”134 virtually any proffered justification would suffice.  A
party would be extremely unlikely to offer such a justification
to the court when challenged, even if this was really their rea-
son for striking the juror.  Furthermore, this limitation over-
looks what is likely one of the most common reasons for
striking jurors: a belief that they are incapable of evaluating the
evidence or participating in the trial, even when the court is
able to provide accommodations to allow this.  That such be-
liefs may well be based in paternalistic attitudes or outmoded
beliefs about the ability of disabled persons to participate in
society,135 rather than animosity or fear, casts further doubt
on the ability of rational basis review to address discriminatory
130 Watson, 483 F.3d at 835.
131 See Harris, 197 F.3d at 876.
132 Watson, 483 F.3d at 833 (citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768–69
(1995) (per curiam)) (“[T]he Court[’s] . . . analysis focused on whether an irrational
justification was race-neutral for Batson purposes; it did not consider whether an
irrational justification itself would violate equal protection.” (footnotes omitted)).
133 Id. at 834.
134 Id.
135 Individuals with physical or intellectual disabilities are often stigmatized
due to their deviation from societal expectations of normalcy. See Annette J.
Towler & David J. Schneider, Distinctions Among Stigmatized Groups, 35 J. AP-
PLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (2005) (identifying the physically and mentally disabled as
stigmatized groups); id. tbl.3 (showing that the physically disabled received high
“pity” scores compared to other groups in study of undergraduate students); see
also Robert Funk, Disability Rights: From Caste to Class in the Context of Civil
Rights, in IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 7, 23–24 (Alan Gartner & Tom
Joe eds., 1987) (describing the social construction of the disabled as persons “who
are perpetually dependent upon the welfare and charity of others”).
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peremptory strikes.  Moreover, this approach seems to allow
striking a juror on the basis that their disability is a proxy for
bias, as that rationale would likely be a rational basis for such
a strike.  Though the question of how these courts would apply
the rational basis test to less compelling justifications for per-
emptory strikes, such as striking a blind juror in a case with no
significant visual evidence, is unanswered, there is not much
reason to think it would afford much protection.
It is also unclear what form a rational basis challenge to a
peremptory strike would take.  It seems unlikely that the full
Batson challenge procedure would be used.  Indeed, even
though the court in Harris considered the possibility that a
peremptory strike of a disabled juror may need to have a ra-
tional basis, it qualified this by noting, in a footnote, that:
By stating that a party must have a ‘rational basis’ for per-
emptory challenges, we do not imply that a party may be
required to provide a reason for the challenges he or she
chooses to exercise against members of non-suspect clas-
ses. . . .  They are presumed legitimate and may not be ques-
tioned absent a showing that the strike is not rationally
related to a legitimate state end.136
This accords with the Supreme Court’s assertion of the contin-
ued vitality of the peremptory strike in J.E.B.: “Parties may also
exercise their peremptory challenges to remove from the venire
any group or class of individuals normally subject to ‘rational
basis’ review.”137  If these statements are taken at face value,
then one is left with serious questions as to how litigants could
challenge a peremptory strike for lacking a rational basis at all.
If parties will not be required to “provide a reason for the chal-
lenges,”138 how could the court have any grounds on which to
judge whether or not the strike had a rational basis, as opposed
to an irrational basis?  Alternatively, one could read this lan-
guage as simply requiring a much more significant prima facie
showing of a lack of a rational basis before a court will look into
the reasons for a particular peremptory strike, which may
prove equally difficult for the challenging party to provide.
When all of the potential shortcomings of this approach are
considered alongside its shaky judicial foundation, it seems
very unlikely that challenging peremptory strikes for lacking a
rational basis will be able to afford much protection to disabled
jurors.
136 Harris, 197 F.3d at 874 n.3.
137 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994).
138 Harris, 197 F.3d at 874 n.3.
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V
POSITIVE STATUTORY LAW IS NEEDED TO PREVENT DISCRIMINATION
ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY IN JURY SELECTION
Despite initial optimism, constitutional law has not proven
to be a fertile ground for the protection of the civil rights of the
disabled.139  Indeed, following the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Cleburne and Garrett, disability advocates have noted that
there is currently no “short-term or long-term constitutional
strategy” for promoting disability civil rights.140  Instead, these
advocates have turned their attention to statutory strategies
that have proven to be much more successful.141  As it seems
unlikely that constitutional equal protection jurisprudence will
protect the disabled from discriminatory peremptory strikes,
statutory law may be the only way to vindicate their rights.
Through legislation, the state can require courts to afford pro-
tections to disabled jurors from peremptory strikes beyond
what is constitutionally required by the Batson line of cases.
While disability appears to have been relegated to rational
basis level review, there is still a clear need to protect the dis-
abled from discriminatory peremptory strikes.  Indeed, many of
the reasons given by the Supreme Court to justify the creation
of the Batson challenge and its expansion to gender-based per-
emptories apply with equal force to the disabled.  Like members
of minority races, the disabled have faced a long history of
discrimination and de facto disenfranchisement on juries.142
As recently as 1994, many states had statutes that categori-
cally excluded persons with certain disabilities from serving on
juries.143  Even today, many states draw jury pools from
driver’s license lists or voter lists, systematically under-
representing the disabled, who are often unable to drive and
have difficulty registering to vote.144  Further, peremptory
strikes of disabled jurors impede legislative efforts to improve
access to jury service for the disabled.  Although state laws and
the ADA now mandate that states make reasonable accommo-
139 See, e.g., Waterstone, supra note 108, at 531 (arguing that “despite a R
nominal victory in Cleburne,” constitutional law for the disabled “has not lived up
to its promise and potential”).
140 Id. at 527.
141 Id. at 555–56.
142 See Nancy Lawler Dickhute, Jury Duty for the Blind in the Time of Reasona-
ble Accommodations: The ADA’s Interface with a Litigant’s Right to a Fair Trial, 32
CREIGHTON L. REV. 849, 849–50 (1999).
143 See Frank & Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 36 n.2 (citing Ark. Code § 16-31- R
102 (2016), which disqualified all blind or deaf persons from jury service prior to a
1994 amendment).
144 See Weis, supra note 15, at 25. R
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dations to allow the disabled to access courts,145 prohibit cate-
gorical exclusions of disabled jurors,146 and sometimes even
provide for additional protections against their exclusion from
juries,147 these laws do little to combat the use of peremptory
strikes against disabled jurors once they have made it to the
venire.
Perhaps the logic of J.E.B. is simply incorrect as it pertains
to disabled jurors.  In Powers v. Ohio, the Court powerfully
articulated the dignitary harm caused to jurors, defendants,
and society by the exclusion of jurors on the basis of race: “[a]
venireperson excluded from jury service because of race suffers
a profound personal humiliation heightened by its public char-
acter.  The rejected juror may lose confidence in the court and
its verdicts, as may the defendant if his or her objections can-
not be heard.”148  It is puzzling, then, that only three years later
the Court noted in J.E.B. that exclusion on the basis of any
non-suspect classification, as opposed to race and gender, does
not cause a comparable dignitary harm because it does not
“reinforce . . . stereotypes about the group’s competence or
predispositions . . . .”149  To be sure, the exclusion of jurors on
the basis of most non-suspect classifications, such as, for ex-
ample, a juror’s occupation, causes no such harm and plays a
legitimate role in the selection of a fair jury.  But it is hard to
accept the argument that peremptory strikes of disabled jurors
do not reinforce negative stereotypes about the competence of
the disabled.  Instead, they reinforce commonly held beliefs
that the disabled are unable to participate meaningfully in
public life and are incompetent to perform the important delib-
erative function of jury service.
A. Federal Legislation Is Unlikely to be Successful in
Reducing Discriminatory Peremptory Strikes
Congress has the power to regulate the procedure of the
federal courts,150 and so could pass legislation prohibiting per-
emptory strikes of jurors on the basis of disability in these
courts, but has yet to do so.  Legislation has been introduced at
the federal level as well, albeit aimed at sexual orientation: the
145 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 (2012).
146 E.g., Galloway v. Super. Ct., 816 F. Supp. 12, 18–19 (D.D.C. 1993).
147 E.g., Tex. Crim. P. Code Ann. § 35.16 (2005) (providing that sensory-im-
paired jurors will not be removed at the for-cause challenge stage unless the court
concludes that they are not fit to serve in that particular case).
148 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413–14 (1991).
149 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143 n.14 (1994).
150 U.S. CONST. art. III, cl. 2; e.g., Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988).
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Jury Access for Capable Citizens and Equality in Service Selec-
tion Act of 2015151 would prevent the exclusion of jurors from
petit juries on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity
in federal courts, following in the steps of the SmithKline deci-
sion, but the law has never been enacted.
However, federalism principles articulated by the Court in
City of Boerne render it unlikely that federal legislation would
be able to address the problem of discriminatory peremptory
strikes in state courts with federal legislation.152  Although in
Tennessee v. Lane, the Court upheld portions of Section II of
the ADA that required states to make courts accessible to the
disabled as a valid exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,153 a federal law
aimed at prohibiting peremptory strikes of disabled jurors in
state courts would likely exceed this power.  Congress’s power
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against states is limited
by a principle of “congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to
that end”;154 to enact ‘prophylactic’ legislation against discrim-
inatory practices that would otherwise not be within Congress’s
power to regulate, Congress must identify an equal protection
injury and remedy it with legislation that is proportional to the
extent of the injury being caused.  In contrast to the significant
amount of findings Congress made regarding the accessibility
of courthouses in Lane,155 there is scant empirical evidence
regarding the effects of peremptory strikes against disabled
jurors.  In addition, the Court has placed a high value on the
practice of peremptory strikes against any group not subject to
heightened scrutiny,156 so it is likely that such a regulation
would exceed Congress’s ability to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment for not being proportional to the harm of peremp-
tory strikes of disabled jurors.  However, the Court has not fully
clarified the scope of its holding in Lane, so it remains possible
151 Jury ACCESS Act, S. 447, 114th Cong. (2015).
152 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997).
153 See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004).
154 Flores, 521 U.S. at 519–20.
155 See Lane, 541 U.S. at 528 (“Given the sheer volume of evidence demon-
strating the nature and extent of unconstitutional discrimination against persons
with disabilities in the provision of public services, the dissent’s contention that
the record is insufficient to justify Congress’[s] exercise of its prophylactic power is
puzzling, to say the least.”).
156 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994) (internal
citations omitted) (“Parties may also exercise their peremptory challenges to re-
move from the venire any group or class of individuals normally subject to ‘ra-
tional basis’ review.”).
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that such a regulation might be able to survive a constitutional
attack if Lane’s “access to the courts” language could be read to
encompass peremptory strikes of disabled jurors as well as
physical impediments to court access.  Due to the predomi-
nance of state-level litigation, federal legislation must be able to
reach state courts if it is to provide any meaningful change to
peremptory strike protections, and this appears unlikely under
current law.
B. States Can Pass Laws or Amend Rules of Trial
Procedure to Prevent Peremptory Strikes of the
Disabled
Some states have had success passing statutory measures
to prevent discrimination on the basis of disability in peremp-
tory strikes.  States can codify peremptory strike protections
for certain classes of jurors in codes of civil and criminal proce-
dure in the sections where jury selection and peremptory strike
procedure are prescribed.157  For example,  California passed
Assembly Bill 87 in 2015,158 modifying its code of civil proce-
dure to prohibit peremptory challenges “on the basis of an
assumption that the prospective juror is biased” due to certain
characteristics, including disability.159  Sponsors of the bill
noted that it was a “modest but necessary step to ensure that
defendants are allowed a trial by an impartial jury that reflects
a cross section of the population in a community” and to make
sure that prospective jurors are not denied the opportunity to
participate in the “civic duty” of jury service.160
The protections for disabled jurors codified in A.B. 87 are
quite similar to those afforded to racial minorities by Batson.
Like Batson, the law protects jurors from peremptory strikes on
the basis of their disability, even if the striking attorney legiti-
mately believes the juror may be biased due to their disability.
It thus remedies the lack of protections disabled jurors receive
due to disability receiving only rational basis level protections
in equal protection jurisprudence, putting disability on an
equal level with racial or gender-based classifications, and pre-
157 See Frank & Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 35 (“[M]any states have enacted R
legislation that does not allow litigants to discriminate against people with disabil-
ities when selecting a jury.”).
158 Assem. B. 87, 2015–16, Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2015).
159 Ca. Code Civ. Proc., § 231.5 (2016).
160 Jason Howe, Governor Signs EQCA-Sponsored Bill Protecting Jury Service
Equality, EQCA (July 17, 2015), http://www.eqca.org/governor-signs-eqca-spon-
sored-bill-protecting-jury-service-equality [https://perma.cc/ZLF3-7JN3].
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vents damaging stereotypes about the disabled from making
their way into the peremptory strike process.
1. Practical Challenges to Implementing Prohibitions on
Peremptory Strikes of the Disabled
While states may be successful in implementing statutory
prohibitions on peremptory strikes on the basis of disability,
challenges will remain in the actual implementation of these
prohibitions.  Most significantly, the issues that plague the Bat-
son challenge procedure will continue to impede the effective-
ness of peremptory strike protections for disabled jurors, and
some aspects of the Batson challenge may actually be more
difficult to satisfy when a party is trying to prove that a peremp-
tory strike was made on the basis of a juror’s disability than on
the basis of their race.  While issues with the Batson proce-
dure’s effectiveness more generally are beyond the scope of this
Note, this section will look at some issues that would be of
particular concern in enforcing prohibitions on strikes against
disabled jurors if protections similar to California A.B. 87161
are enacted by the courts.
As the disabled undoubtedly make up a far smaller per-
centage of the jury pool than racial minorities, demonstrating
purposive discrimination may be more difficult than in cases in
which racial discrimination is alleged.  This could make the
prima facie showing element of the Batson challenge162 a more
difficult barrier for litigants to surpass, as ‘targeting’ of dis-
abled jurors may be difficult to demonstrate from a purely sta-
tistical perspective. Batson itself notes that a prima facie case
of an inference of discrimination can often be made by a show-
ing of “a ‘pattern’ of strikes against black jurors included in the
particular venire.”163  Such a showing may simply be impossi-
ble to make if there is, for example, only a single disabled juror
on the venire.  While “the prosecutor’s questions and state-
ments during voir dire examination and in exercising his chal-
lenges may support . . . an inference of discriminatory
purpose,”164 such a showing may be much more difficult to
make as an attorney is unlikely to reveal their discriminatory
intent during this phase of the selection process if they are
aware that striking jurors on this basis is illegal.  However, this
step is highly discretionary, representing “a common sense
161 See supra subpart V.B.
162 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986).
163 Id.
164 Id. at 97.
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judgment that race or gender appears to motivate a party’s
strike,”165 so trial judges will need to be sensitive to parties’
peremptory strikes of disabled jurors and whether or not there
are grounds for further investigation into the motives of the
striking attorney.
Striking parties will still have the ability to offer up a non-
discriminatory explanation for their strike of a disabled juror in
the second portion of the Batson challenge procedure.  This has
long been a weak point of the Batson challenge procedure, as it
is often fairly easy for an attorney to come up with a non-
discriminatory justification for striking a juror, even if they
were really striking the juror on the basis of a protected classifi-
cation.  Unlike with race, attorneys may wish to strike disabled
jurors not because of a belief that they are biased because of
their disability, but also because of a belief that the disabled
juror will not be able to interpret the evidence properly because
of their disability.  Such beliefs are often incorrect and reflec-
tive of old attitudes about the ability of the disabled to partici-
pate meaningfully in society.  Ideally, states should strive to
limit these types of challenges to the for-cause striking portion
of jury selection, so that jurors who would actually have diffi-
culty interpreting the evidence (i.e., a blind juror in a case
relying on film evidence of the defendant) are removed before
the peremptory strike phase.  In this phase of jury selection,
the judge will have a better opportunity to weigh the impact of
the juror’s disability on their ability to participate on the jury,
and can receive input from the juror themselves.  But cases
such as Harris and Watson166 demonstrate that this is not
always the case, and attorneys may try to remove jurors at the
peremptory strike phase for this reason.  There is therefore
some uncertainty regarding how courts will respond to this sort
of justification when a peremptory strike of a disabled juror is
challenged.
165 Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 20, at 1121.  The Batson court also recog- R
nized the discretion that trial judges will have in determining whether a prima
facie case of discriminatory intent has been made and should “consider all rele-
vant circumstances.”  Batson, 476 U.S. at 79 (“We have confidence that trial
judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circum-
stances concerning the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges creates a prima
facie case of discrimination against black jurors.”).
166 See supra subpart IV.C.
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CONCLUSION
Trial by jury has been recognized as a fundamental right
since before the founding of America,167 and the institution of
the jury suffers a blow to its legitimacy when it fails to be
representative of the diversity of viewpoints in American soci-
ety.168  A representative jury ensures a truly impartial trial and
that all groups are able to share in this valuable opportunity for
civic engagement.169  Though the disabled constitute a minor-
ity of the population, their viewpoint is no less necessary to
securing the benefits of a representative jury than that of
groups already afforded protection from discriminatory strikes.
As the disabled become more represented in many areas of
society, their continued underrepresentation on juries will be-
come even more difficult to justify.  Discriminatory peremptory
strikes are a significant, discretionary means by which the dis-
abled can continue to be excluded from juries even when other
reforms aimed at increasing jury accessibility are put into
place.  Current equal protection jurisprudence provides scant
protection for disabled jurors, but states can protect these ju-
rors by statutory means, and will need to do so in order to
secure the benefits of a truly representational jury.
Unfortunately, much work remains to be done on many
fronts before we will begin to see a significant increase in the
representation of the disabled on juries.  The ADA and other
legislation designed to increase the accessibility of courts has
removed many of the obstacles faced by disabled persons to
serving on a jury, but do little to address many other sources of
underrepresentation, including juror lists that systematically
exclude the disabled.  Peremptory strike reform will therefore
need to be only a piece of a broader legislative strategy to in-
crease the representation of the disabled on juries, but it will be
an essential piece nonetheless.
167 See NANCY GERTNER & JUDITH H. MIZNER, THE LAW OF JURIES 2 (5th ed. 2011).
168 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 134 (1994) (noting that
maintaining a diverse jury assures impartiality).
169 See id.
